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ABSTRACT 
The ethical position underpinning decisionmaking is an important concern for conservation biologists 
when setting priorities for interventions. The recent debate on how best to protect nature has centered on 
contrasting intrinsic and aesthetic values against utilitarian and economic values, driven by an inevitable 
global rise in conservation conflicts. These discussions have primarily been targeted at species and 
ecosystems for success, without explicitly expressing concern for the intrinsic value and welfare of 
individual animals. In part, this is because animal welfare has historically been thought of as an 
impediment to conservation. However, practical implementations of conservation that provide good 
welfare outcomes for individuals are no longer conceptually challenging; they have become reality. This 
reality, included under the auspices of “compassionate conservation,” reflects an evolved ethic for sharing 





Every day, environmental policymakers, conservation practitioners, and land managers, make decisions 
that affect the lives of wild animals. The societal norms that shape the context for those decisions are 
complex, entrenched, and often opaque to the wider community. Despite the complexity, there is growing 
awareness that conservation decisions— particularly those aimed at resolving conflicts between humans 
and other animals but also conflicts between other animals—often result in the harm and death of other 
animals. That these animals carry the burden of achieving conservation objectives through their harm and 
death is often ignored or else justified on utilitarian grounds. It is common for some members of a single 
species to be killed for the “good” of their species or for members of one species to be killed for the 
“good” of another species (e.g., golden hamsters for black-footed ferrets; Bekoff 2010). Animals are also 
routinely killed to prevent them from moving from protected areas to private land (e.g., wolves and 
dingoes; Treves and Karanth 2003) and because they are considered to be invasive or pests (Littin 
2010). These trade-offs often result in harm and death for captive and wild animals, justified in the name 
of conservation and human benefit (Callicott 1990, Bekoff 2003, Ben- Ami et al. 2014). The question is 
where the trade-offs stop and the protection of individuals begins. How many individuals are acceptable 
to kill and harm in the name of conservation (Vucetich and Nelson 2007) and at what point does their 
well-being matter (Bekoff 2013)? Conservation practice and policy have historically addressed this 
question uncertainly and often without virtue (Vucetich and Nelson 2013). This has not been an easy 
question to resolve, primarily because the problem has not been with conservation itself, but rather with 
the manner in which it has been performed. 
In turn, this situation can, in part, be attributed to the perceived difficulty in comparing complex and 
competing sets of values (e.g., individual rights and values versus ecosystem health), notions of human 
exceptionalism and dominance, and the overly strong focus on species welfare (as opposed to individual 
welfare) in conservation metrics. The result is that without consensus on how to accommodate what 
appear to be contradictory values, moral confusion and ethical dilemmas are common. Consequently, 
there has traditionally been a lack of animal welfare concern in conservation decisionmaking when 
addressing the stark but real question of which animal lives and which animal dies, in part because of 
past disagreements between conservation and animal welfare scientists on the role of individual welfare 
in conservation (e.g., Soulé 1985). Environmental legislation and policy is almost wholly grounded in 
measures of species and ecosystem welfare (Gaston and Fuller 2007), with little emphasis on individual 
welfare. In contrast, animal welfare legislation often has tight control over the individual welfare of 
domestic animals and livestock. Wild animals are frequently exempted from animal welfare legislation by 
categorizing them as pests, a term used to define a species that is a nuisance, out of balance, invasive, 
or exotic (Nagy and Johnson 2013). Often, the issues faced by conservation managers are in relation to 
species that are placed in this category, and, perhaps not coincidentally, transgressions of humane 
treatment are frequently justified by the application of this label (Littin 2010). 
Language and culture are strongly linked to our treatment of other animals (Webb and Raffaelli 2008). 
Societal norms are often rendered with euphemisms to surmount the impression of transgressions of 
equity and justice, therefore obscuring the obvious ethical conflict our actions cause. Bias in the selection 
of flagship species to protect, such that flagship species are used to leverage support for broader 
conservation objectives, is a complex mix of charisma (Lorimer 2007, Tisdell and Nantha 2007) and 
politics (Yeo and Neo 2010). Animal protection is strongly influenced by prevailing views on sentience 
and cognition (Bekoff and Jamieson 1990), position on the phylogenetic scale (Harrop 1999), and utility to 
humans (O’Sullivan 2011). Of course, not all species can be saved from extinction, nor can all individuals 
be spared from dying or suffering needlessly at the hands of humans. But there is currently little 
deliberate ethical enquiry in how trade-offs in lives are made (Larson 2007), and there has been little 
room for empathy (Bekoff 2013). 
Blockages in conservation decisionmaking  
The focus on species welfare and anthropocentric views of nature has been an impediment to 
scientifically validating the inclusion of individual welfare in conservation. Although species welfare, with 
its focus on the prevention of extinction, is a vital and admirable conservation objective, the welfare of 
individuals and their social groups should also be considered as important. Harm to animals is more than 
just the extinction of species and subsequent declines in biodiversity. This awareness stems from the 
dramatic rise in human–wildlife conflicts (Redpath et al. 2013) and a growing recognition of the intrinsic 
value of conscious and sentient animals (Bekoff 2007, 2014). Harm also encompasses the suffering 
experienced by individuals and associated costs to social units and the populations to which they 
contribute (Fraser 1993, Paquet and Darimont 2010). Although many of these harms result from global 
conservation problems, such as habitat loss, climate change, and pollution, many harms paradoxically 
result from humans engaging in proactive conservation measures (Fraser and MacRae 2011). 
Although clear and inclusive ethical foundations for conservation have been articulated numerous times, 
these foundations have been gradually eroded by human needs and benefits and prevailing views of 
human exceptionalism. Motivations for humans to engage in conservation encompass a wide variety of 
societal values, incorporating ethical, aesthetic, and economic concerns (Doak et al. 2013). These often-
competing values are increasingly resulting in conflict and present considerable philosophical, moral, and 
practical problems for conservation planners and policymakers. Conservation interventions require 
decisionmakers to make trade-offs among philosophical and ethical value sets and practical limitations. 
Problematically, conflict resolution between conservation and other human endeavors is, more often than 
not, dictated by decisionmaking aimed at economic and utilitarian values (Artelle et al. 2014), to the det-
riment of aesthetic and ethical values (Jepson and Canney 2003). The denial of the intrinsic value and 
sentience of nonhuman animals is also strongly influential. Despite having the protection of animals and 
conflict resolution at its heart, conservation science as a discipline has struggled to establish a strong 
environmental ethic and moral philosophy, to the detriment of individual animals. 
Conservation is ethically challenged  
Discourse surrounding the ethical position of conservation is not new (Ehrlich 2002, 2009, Minteer and 
Collins 2005, Dunlop 2006). Although the dominant paradigm governing conservation policy is based on a 
limited anthropocentric version of utilitarianism, which is a form of consequentialism, there are several 
other ethical positions with implications for conservation and animal protection, such as deontology 
(Regan 1983) and deep ecology (Naess 1973, Routley 1973) that reject the utilitarian view of the environ-
ment (i.e., the shallow view). The importance of ethics in conservation was noted as part of the founding 
principles of the Wildlife Society in 1937 in the United States, in which the “development of all types of 
wildlife management along sound biological lines” was seen as a crucial move away from indiscriminate 
exploitation for human benefits (Bennitt et al. 1937). Aldo Leopold further championed this idea in 1949 
with his land ethic (Leopold 1949). At that time, Leopold firmly embedded the sharing of land between 
humans and other animals in his land ethic, allowing for both the preservation of wilderness where 
possible and for economic exploitation (Callicott 1990). Importantly, the land ethic approach 
encompassed the view that individuals and their well-being mattered (Davradou and Namkoong 2001). 
The implementation of this ethic, however, has remained stymied by the more dominant anthropocentric 
utilitarian ethic that espouses decisions that promote overall well-being (actions for the greater good). Not 
only has exclusive concern for human benefits taken a strong hold of motivational mechanisms (e.g., as 
proposed in the new conservation; Kareiva and Marvier 2012), but the grounding of conservation in 
species welfare has, perhaps unintentionally, subjugated individuals for collective benefits. 
The challenge for conservation science is to decide whether current decisionmaking in practice and policy 
evolves to accommodate contemporary moral systems and to incorporate the rapidly developing scientific 
understanding of the sentience and consciousness of nonhuman animals or whether, at a practical level, 
the trumping of welfare outcomes for individual animals by species (or population or ecosystem) welfare 
or by human benefits continues to be permissible (Fraser 2012). Evidence from conservation policy 
suggests that this challenge is often sidestepped and that the status quo remains by default (Artelle et al. 
2014). Why has this happened? Negativity toward individual welfare has become entrenched because it 
has been viewed as an impediment to holistic decisionmaking. Dominant and entrenched values are 
maintained through individual and collective aspirations (Jepson and Canney 2003) and through cultural 
norms and perceptions (Lejano and Fernandez de Castro 2013), whereas disengagement of moral self-
sanctions allow for harmful practices by removing self-restraint (Bandura 2007). Entrenched views can 
have a significant and wide-ranging influence on conservation policy and decisionmaking, such that vocal 
stakeholders often assert value-based rhetoric to the detriment of alternative value sets (e.g., Ramp 
2013). This is evident in a wide variety of conservation issues that result in direct conflict between 
advocates of alternative positions (Redpath et al. 2013) but, conversely, can also drive efforts to alleviate 
conflicts via education programs and comanagement strategies (e.g., Gelcich et al. 2008). 
Compassion in conservation  
The good news is that the asserted dichotomy between conservation and animal welfare has waned, and 
the unifying aim of reducing harm to nonhuman animals in both these disciplines has gathered 
momentum (Fox and Bekoff 2011, Fraser 2010, Littin 2010, Paquet and Darimont 2010, Bekoff 2013, 
2014). The challenge has been for decisionmakers to establish a practical framework (i.e., one that is 
ideologically sound and able to be implemented through on-ground activities) that accommodates the 
ethical and moral position of individual animals within conservation practice (Bekoff 2002). In a case of 
widespread convergent evolution, examples of conservation initiatives aimed at achieving both 
conservation goals and reduced harm to individuals have emerged over the last few decades. Despite the 
dominant lethal paradigm underlying many conservation initiatives (Bergstrom et al. 2014), 
compassionate approaches to solving conflicts between humans and wildlife have evolved. These 
highlight the rise of what has been termed compassionate conservation (Bekoff 2010, 2013), a rapidly 
growing international and cross-disciplinary movement that stipulates that we need a conservation ethic 
that incorporates the protection of other animals as individuals, not just as members of populations of 
species but valued in their own right. 
The evolutionary underpinnings for the ethical behavior of compassion lie in the evolutionary processes 
that reward empathic adaptations (Goetz et al. 2010), but compassion can be practically defined as 
reflecting empathy in humans for nonhuman animals and a drive to alleviate harm and suffering. Unlike 
the dominant utilitarian approach to conservation, which puts the cost of reaching conservation targets 
squarely on the shoulders of other animals, a compassionate ethic for conservation brings empathy into 
decisionmaking alongside other values. It is not a rights position but, rather, puts forward a scientific and 
evidence-based conceptual approach that stipulates that conservation initiatives should first do no harm 
(Bekoff 2010). This is important not only because of what we now know about the cognitive and emotional 
lives (consciousness and sentience) of other animals (Bekoff 2007, Bekoff and Pierce 2009) but also as a 
moral imperative for providing modern solutions for sharing space with nature and for fostering the 
possibility for diverse species to live in peaceful coexistence (Hinchliffe et al. 2005). Compassionate 
conservation allows for—but does not prescriptively dictate—outcomes in which the interests of others 
supersede those of humans. 
Examples in which compassionate conservation principles are being applied have been steadily growing. 
Predation by carnivores is being successfully managed using fencing, fladry, and guard animals (Fox and 
Bekoff 2011) rather than through shooting, trapping, and poisoning programs. Pack structures in 
unexploited predator populations show evidence of declining rogue behavior and pack stability (Purcell 
2010), thereby reducing negative interactions with humans (Bekoff and Jamieson 1996). Issues in which 
species interfere with human endeavors are being solved by focusing on holistic ecological solutions and 
educational programs (e.g., restricting access to rubbish tips and putting roofs on city rubbish bins for ibis 
in Australia, as in Martin et al. 2012, and the use of fencing and local community engagement in the 
management of brown bears in Turkey; Ambarli and Bilgin 2008). The costs of ignoring individual welfare 
in scientific programs are also gaining attention (Jewell 2013), because mainstream invasive techniques 
for studying animals are now known to be stressful and change species-typical behavior (Bekoff 2000). 
Human–wildlife conflicts can be exacerbated by a lack of science, transparency, and concern for harm to 
animals in decisionmaking (Artelle et al. 2014). 
Compassionate conservation is challenging decisionmakers to have clear objectives where the lives of 
animals are affected. If interventions are necessary, the range of values of different stakeholders (human, 
nonhuman) should be articulated so that trade-offs may be transparently evaluated. Adaptive 
management principles are a must, in which scientifically credible monitoring programs measure key 
performance indicators. For situations in which harm to animals, either from an individual or species 
welfare perspective, is part of an intervention option, clear data are needed on the minimum number of 
animals that will be affected to achieve the desired outcome. Rating systems for harm exist for domestic 
animals and livestock and should be integrated into conservation interventions targeting wildlife. 
Cause for optimism and a call to action  
Although millions of animals are killed in the name of conservation around the world each year, there is 
good cause to be optimistic. Acceptance of the intrinsic value of wild animals in nature and an associated 
motivation to prevent harm to those animals, is often reported as an almost universal ethic among a wide 
variety of stakeholders (Butler and Acott 2007, Dubois and Fraser 2013). Compassionate conservation 
can help by providing solutions to conservation conflicts that have either proved intractable to resolve or 
incurred a heavy welfare cost to wild or captive individuals. That is not to say that individual welfare 
supersedes species or ecosystem welfare, only that we cannot continue to ignore individuals in 
conservation practice. By considering animal welfare alongside animal conservation, it becomes possible 
to establish wildlife conservation frameworks that are explicitly oriented toward the management of the 
lives of individuals and their social groups and not just the species or population as a whole (Fraser 2010, 
Paquet and Darimont 2010). The word management reflects the fact that, in today’s world, humans must 
interfere in the lives of other animals to resolve conflicts that inevitably arise from sharing space. 
Despite clear progress, decisionmakers have only just begun to recognize the importance and utility of a 
compassionate and practical framework for conservation decisionmaking and triage. Difficult questions 
need to be asked about how best to engage with nature to resolve conservation conflicts. The aspirations 
underlying compassionate conservation have been long held by those interested in protecting nature, but 
as a movement, with a clear framework of operation, compassionate conservation is in its infancy. 
Factoring compassion into conservation presents a simple and morally acceptable approach to resolving 
issues of land sharing by using the universal ethic of a concern for the suffering of others and attempts to 
alleviate it. Peaceful coexistence with other animals and their homes, grounded in compassion, is needed 
in an increasingly human-dominated world if society is to preserve and conserve nature in holistic and 
humane ways. 
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